The 1951 Convention
Introduction
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention") defines 'persecution' based on five enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (United Nations 1951, art 1(A)(2)). This list of protected groups has not changed since its inception, although the political and social context that gave rise to the Refugee Convention has seen dramatic changes since that time. Accordingly, it is appropriate to critically examine the ostensibly narrow scope of protected groups in the Refugee Convention and assess whether there are other international law sources that could provide assistance on a more inclusive approach to protection. This article attempts to carry out such an examination by first looking at how 'membership of a particular social group' has been interpreted to protect additional categories. It then conducts a survey of international instruments in the areas of international human rights law, transnational criminal law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law to assess what groups are protected under these regimes. Finally, it compares these groups to determine whether 'membership of a particular social group' can encompass the broader protections that may be afforded under other international law regimes.
1.
Groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; 2.
Groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and
In 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") issued its "Guidelines on International Protection on Membership of a Particular Social Group" ("Guidelines") to provide guidance to states interpreting and applying this ground. The Guidelines emphasize that MPSG should be interpreted in a manner that evolves with changing societies and international human rights norms (UNHCR 2002, para. 2-3) . To prevent protection gaps, the Guidelines put forward a comprehensive definition that incorporates the protected characteristics and social perception approach:
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human rights. (UNHCR 2002, para. 11) The UNHCR's comprehensive definition has led to its misapplication as a cumulative test in the United States and Europe. The United States, while initially following a protected characteristics approach in Acosta, has taken a cumulative approach in recent years. In 2006, the BIA relied on the UNHCR Guidelines to require social visibility as a mandatory element of the MPSG analysis (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 430; Marouf 2019, p. 489) . In 2014, the BIA clarified that social visibility meant social distinction and added an additional requirement of "particularity" (Marouf 2019, pp. 489-92; Owens 2018 Owens , p. 1261 , creating a tripartite test requiring a protected characteristic, social distinction, and particularity (Grant 2017, p. 917) . 7 The European Union's Qualification Directive has similarly been interpreted as requiring a cumulative test (EASO 2016, p. 49) . The Qualification Directive (EU 2011) defines MPSG in Article 10(1)(d):
(d) a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in particular:
-members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and -that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
The Qualification Directive has been criticized as distorting the UNHCR's approach by proposing a more stringent test that may lead to protection gaps (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 432) . However, there is no international consensus on which approach is the correct one. The UNHCR's comprehensive definition recognizes both approaches as valid, without advocating for one approach over the other. While there may not be a need to move towards a single standard, consistency is desirable to prevent protection gaps between countries.
Despite these different interpretive approaches, state practice demonstrates consensus on several aspects of this ground. First, the PSG cannot be defined exclusively by a shared fear of persecution, though such fear may be a relevant factor to determine the group's visibility (UNHCR 2002, para. 14; Hathaway and Foster 2014, pp. 424-25) . 8 Second, the group does not need to be cohesive (UNHCR 7 The BIA's social visibility requirement led to a split in the Circuit courts, with the Seventh and Third Circuit rejecting this component as unreasonable in decisions such as Gatimi v Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (USCA, 7th Cir 2009) ["It is true that our sister circuits have generally approved 'social visibility' as a criterion . . . We just don't see what work 'social visibility' does"] and Valdiviezo-Galdamez v Attorney General of the United States, 663 F.3d 582 at 609 (USCA, 3rd Cir 2011) ["the BIA's requirement that a 'particular social group' possesses the elements of 'social visibility' and 'particularity' is not entitled to Chevron deference. . . . Indeed, we are hard-pressed to understand how the 'social visibility' requirement was satisfied in prior cases using the Acosta standard"]. For a review of the US approach, see (Marouf 2019, pp. 489-92; Owens 2018 Owens , pp. 1259 Grant 2017, pp. 904-21; Vogel 2019, pp. 359-61) . For the UNHCR's position rejecting this expanded test, see Grace v Barr (Attorney General), Brief for the UNHCR as Amicus Curiae, No 19-5013 (DC Cir 2019); OLBD v Barr (Attorney General), Brief for the UNHCR as Amicus Curiae, No 18-1816 (1st Cir 2019 . 8 See e.g., A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, [1997] HCA 4, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 242 : "There is more than a hint of circularity in the view that a number of persons may be held to fear persecution by reasons of membership of a particular 2002, para. 15); 9 there is no need to establish a voluntary, associated relationship with the PSG (UNHCR 2002, para. 15; Hathaway and Foster 2014, pp. 425-26; Foster 2012, p. 5) . Third, not all members of the group need to be at risk of persecution; a person is not precluded from making a claim if some members of the group are not persecuted where, for example, they hide their shared characteristic or are unknown to or cooperate with the persecutor (UNHCR 2002, para. 17) . Fourth, the size of the group is irrelevant (UNHCR 2002, para. 18; Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 425; Foster 2012, p. 5) ; the group may be as large as 'women' or as small as a family (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 425) . While there is some degree of discomfort with the large size of some groups because of floodgate concerns, the other Convention grounds similarly may encompass large groups and, therefore, MPSG should not be exceptionally limited (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 425) . Finally, absent special circumstances, mere membership is not enough to establish MPSG (UNHCR 2002, para. 16; UNHCR 2019, para. 79 ).
Recognized Categories of Particular Social Group
Decision-makers have recognized many types of PSGs when addressing specific refugee claims, which can be broadly organized into eight categories: gender, sexual orientation, family, age, disability, economic or social class, voluntary association, and former status. 10 These categories illustrate the extent to which States have been willing (or not) to recognize certain types of PSGs, as not all will fit neatly into a single category and must be specific to the claimant's circumstances. Further, these categories can, and often do, overlap with each other and with other protected grounds in the Refugee Convention (UNHCR 2002, para. 4; UNHCR 2019, para. 77 ).
Gender
Most states recognize, to varying degrees, that gender can constitute a PSG. Such claims often focus on 'women' or a subset thereof, though similar claims can arise for 'men' as a protected group (Foster 2012, p. 40) . Decision-makers in North America and Europe have recognized a variety of gender-based claims as constituting PSGs, including forced marriage, domestic violence, abortion, and trafficking (Schoenholtz 2015, p. 110) . Gender-based claims also include gender identity. 11 The protected characteristics approach easily recognizes gender as an innate characteristic (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 437; IRB 2018, s. 4.5) . 12 While the Qualification Directive requires only "due consideration" be given to gender-related aspects, many European countries recognize gender as a PSG. 13 Several countries also include gender in their domestic legislation or guidelines on refugee protection. 14 New Zealand has gone as far as recognizing 'women' as a PSG in several decisions. 15 social group where what is said to unite those persons into a particular social group is their common fear of persecution" cited in (Foster 2012, pp. 5-6) . 9 See e.g., Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, (2002) 210 CLR 1, [2002] HCA 14, 33: "cohesiveness may assist to define a group; but it is not an essential attribute of a group. Some particular social groups are notoriously lacking in cohesiveness" cited in (Foster 2012, p. 5) . 10 These categories draw on Foster (2012) 12 The first category of PSG in Ward recognizes "gender is an innate characteristic and, therefore, women may form a particular social group within the Convention refugee definition" ((IRB 1996, A(III))). 13 For example, the Netherlands, following the Qualification Directive's approach, does not recognize 'women' alone, while Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland have recognized women or a subset of women as a PSG (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 437; Foster 2012, p. 41 ). 14 For example, Latin American countries including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela include gender in their domestic legislation on refugee protection (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 438) . Countries including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have guidelines for decision-makers assessing gender-based claims (Boyd 2018, p. 19 The social perception approach has had more difficulty in accepting 'women' as a social group set apart from society (Foster 2012, p. 46) , often leading to inconsistent decisions. Australian decision-makers have rejected gender-based claims such as "young single women" as not distinct from society at large or the group size, such as "Tanzanian women," as overly broad (Foster 2012, p. 46) , while recognizing "single women in India," "married women in Tanzania," and "young Somali women" as constituting PSGs (AAT 2019, pp. 34-35) . The United States is inconsistent in its approach, with some courts accepting women as a PSG and others rejecting it under the social visibility test (Foster 2012, p. 47; Marouf 2019, p. 514) . In Germany and France, decision-makers often focus on whether a narrower subset of women have transgressed societal norms in a way that makes that group visible to society (Foster 2012, pp. 47-48) . These decisions are problematic for future claimants because the decision-maker's precise reasoning and the evidential basis are often unclear, making it challenging for claimants to rely on the jurisprudence for guidance (Foster 2012, p. 48) .
The major challenge for claimants making a gender-based claim is the artificial limiting of this category. Decision-makers and advocates are reluctant to recognize 'women' as a PSG, preferring to narrow the category based on additional criteria. 16 While refining the group can avoid perceived floodgate concerns, it often leads to complex categories that import unnecessary elements into the description, such as the nature of the harm (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 440; Foster 2012, pp. 44-45) . For example, in Re Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec 357 at 365 (BIA 1996) , an important decision on analyzing gender-based claims (Vogel 2019, pp. 361-64) , the PSG was described as "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice." 17 In Ayala Sosa and Others v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 428, para. 26-29, the Federal Court upheld the Immigration Board of Canada's finding that "young, impoverished and uneducated teenagers living in small, gang-riddled communities who refuse to be recruited because of a strongly held political opinion that disagrees with Mara activities" do not constitute a PSG. The Board found that if the characteristics that were not immutable were removed (youth, poverty, and education), the applicant's claim was based on being targeted. 18 This narrow approach highlights two problems. First, the group may be refined to the point it is solely based on persecution, which runs contrary to the principle that the ground cannot be defined only by the risk of persecution (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 411; Foster 2012, p. 45) . Second, overly narrow group definitions lead to continuous litigation on the specific category, rather than acknowledging 'women' (or 'men') as a PSG (Hathaway and Foster 442) .
While 'women' as a category should, theoretically, suffice because it is firmly established that group size does not matter, a subset of women can be helpful if appropriately delineated. In more recent cases, the common approach has been to define the group as "women of country X" (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 441 UKHL 20, 2 All ER 545, 9-10 (1999) BAILII ("Shah") recognized that "women in Pakistan" as a social group "is neither novel nor heterodox. It is simply a logical application of the seminal reasoning in Acosta's case" under the on "the Convention grounds of political opinion and membership of a particular social group, namely women. Either suffices"]. But see BQ (Pakistan), [2015] NZIPT 800675 at para. 45-46 [qualifying the PSG as "Ahmadi women"]. 16 Part of addressing this challenge is educating lawyers not to rely on overly technical descriptions, particularly as the claimant often defines the group which is then narrowed throughout the proceeding (Foster 2012, pp. 42-43) . 17 (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 439 protected characteristics approach; just because some members of the group may avoid persecution does not mean that social group does not exist. 19
Sexual Orientation
Sexual orientation and similarly-situated claims are well-recognized as a PSG in many jurisdictions 20 and have been recognized since at least the 1990s (Lewis and Shuman 2016, p. 1) . 21 In some countries, protection for persons based on sexual orientation is incorporated in domestic legislation as an example of a protected status or a standalone ground. 22 The Qualification Directive recognizes that sexual orientation may constitute a PSG, depending on country-specific circumstances. 23 The protected characteristics approach has long-recognized claims based on an individual's actual or imputed sexuality (Hathaway and Foster 442) . Canada was one of the first countries to recognize, under the immutability analysis, homosexuality as a PSG; 24 sexual orientation constitutes a significant proportion of contemporary Canadian refugee claims and are more likely than not to succeed (Rehaag 2017, p. 286) . While the jurisprudence largely focuses on homosexuality, 25 decision-makers have resisted a narrow interpretation of sexuality to recognize a broad spectrum of sexual identity, including "lesbian, bisexual, intersex, and transgender applicants" as members of a PSG (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 444; Foster 2012, p. 51 ). However, the success rate for claimants may vary across subsets of sexual minorities (Rehaag 2017, p. 286; Lewis and Shuman 2016, p. 2) . Further, decision-makers have accepted 'homosexuals in country X' as a PSG without relying on overly technical definitions that arise in other areas, such as gender-based claims (Foster 2012, p. 50) .
Sexual orientation is, to a degree, revealed by an individual's behaviour. While some decision-makers oppose the view that 'discretion' is a relevant consideration (Foster 2012, p. 52; Lewis and Shuman 2016, p. 2), others-particularly those following a social perception approach-suggest that a claimant may be denied refugee protection where they may avoid persecution in their home country by hiding their sexual orientation. 26 However, the UNHCR (2008, para. 32) rejects that individuals should be required to conceal their sexual orientation. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in C-199/12, c-200/12, C201/12 X, Y Z, 4th Chamber (CJEU 2013) also rejects this view, holding that individuals should not be forced to hide their sexual orientation.
Despite their prominence in the case law, claims based on sexual orientation are particularly challenging because the refugee determination process reduces sexual identity to a "simplistic notion" that requires an individual to act in a certain way (Millbank 2009, pp. 15-16) (Querton 2012) . 20 For example, there is legislative protection for refugee status based on sexual orientation in Sweden, South Africa, Ireland, and Spain (Hathaway and Foster 2014, pp. 443-44) . Despite this longstanding recognition, only a small number of claims are based on sexual orientation (Millbank 2009, p. 4) . 21 See e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689; Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, I&N Dec 819 (BIA 1994) [In 1990 , the BIA found homosexuality as constituting a PSG. In 1994, the Attorney General ordered that BIA decision to be a precedent]. 22 Homosexuality is incorporated as an example or protected ground in some countries, but in a German decision homosexuality was found not to be distinct enough (Foster 2012, pp. 48-49, 53) . 23 The Qualification Directive (EU 2011, art 30) expressly recognizes sexual orientation may constitute a PSG. This recognition has been affirmed by the CJEU (EASO 2016, pp. 50-51) and by Member States such as France (EASO 2016, p. 51; Mr O v OFPRA, No 16014463 (CNDA 2017) ). 24 (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 443) referencing Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, p. 739 ["[t] he first category would embrace individuals fearing persecution on such bases as gender, linguistic background, and sexual orientation"]. 25 Homosexuality has been recognized as a protected characteristic in Canada, Belgium, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Foster 2012, pp. 49-50) . 26 France's approach is that if a person hides their sexual identity others cannot perceive it (Foster 2012, pp. 52, 54) . But see Hathaway and Foster (2014, p. 445) rejecting this view as behavioural limits should be in accordance with international human rights law and principals. decision-maker. 27 Claimants often face challenges related to credibility, Western notions and other stereotypes of sexual identity, and that their fear of persecution is sufficiently serious 28 (Rehaag 2017, pp. 263-64; LaViolette 2015, pp. 9-15; Lewis and Shuman 2016, p. 3). 29
Family
The degree to which family is recognized as a PSG depends on the court's interpretative approach. Family has long been recognized as a protected status (Schoenholtz 2015, p. 114) and is "[o]ne of the most visible examples of a particular social group" (UNHCR 2011, p. 87 ). This category is easily recognized under the protected characteristics approach, as kinship ties are an immutable characteristic (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 446; Foster 2012, p. 54) . The case law is not as straightforward in countries that apply the social perception test (Foster 2012, p. 55), though several European countries recognize family may constitute a PSG. 30 Family as a PSG has faced significant challenges in the United States. While kinship ties were initially recognized in Acosta as an obvious example of a protected group, decision-makers have since found that not every family will meet the social visibility requirement (Foster 2012, p. 55; Owens 2018; Marouf 2019, pp. 507-9) . In July 2019, the Attorney General overturned the BIA's decision in Matter of L-E-A, 27 I&N Dec 581 (AG 2019), concluding at page 581 of his opinion that while clans may constitute a PSG, "most nuclear families are not inherently socially distinct and therefore do not qualify as 'particular social groups.'" The Attorney General goes on to say-at page 595-that his opinion does not bar family-based claims if the claimant can show the "immediate family carries greater societal import," making it practically more difficult for a claimant to succeed on this ground.
What constitutes 'family' may vary depending on the cultural context in which the risk emerged, extending beyond the nuclear family and blood relations (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 446 ). An individual may be at risk of persecution where their family is targeted because of the political, social, or economic activities of a family member, or a relative's sexual identity (Foster 2012, p. 447 ). Claims where a family member is targeted for revenge or retribution, unconnected from a Convention ground, are more controversial (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 447; Foster 2012, p. 56) . In several jurisdictions, the claimant will not succeed unless the primary target is at risk based on a Convention 27 For example, decision-makers have drawn an adverse inference when assessing the credibility of an individual claiming status based on sexual identity that have been involved in a heterosexual relationship. Claimants have faced more difficulties in Australia and the United Kingdom, but less so in Canada and New Zealand. In Canada, the Federal Court has been alive to avoiding simplistic notions of sexual orientation. See e.g., Leke v Canada, 2007 FC 848, [2007 is precedential for its finding that sexual orientation can be self-defined rather than an immutable characteristic [finding that gay men with female sexual identities constitute a PSG]. 28 The CJEU decision in C-199/12, c-200/12, C201/12 X, Y Z, 4th Chamber (CJEU 2013) held that criminal laws prohibiting homosexuality supports finding that such persons form a PSG, but the existence of such laws is not itself "sufficiently serious" to be an act of persecution. Laws criminalizing homosexuality are not required to determine an individual is persecuted for their sexual orientation: see e.g., No 399780, 2nd Chamber (Conseil d'Etat 2017). 29 For a list of reasons sexual orientation-based claims were rejected in a study of unreported refugee decisions in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see (Braimah 2016, p. 564 ground; 31 this may include claims based on political opinion, but exclude claims arising from criminal matters such as gang affiliation (see Section 2.2.8 for more on gang affiliation). Decision-makers in Australia, Canada, and Germany, and the United States have rejected claims based on family ties where the fear of persecution is not sufficiently tied to a Convention ground for the primary claimant. 32 However, Hathaway and Foster (2014, pp. 448-49) argue that the individual is at risk based on their family status, not the activities of the targeted family member, and to require a claimant to prove the primary target is also being targeted for a Convention ground would impose a stricter criteria on the claimant than is required of other grounds. An individual may also be at risk from a family member, such as abusive relationships. PSGs based on domestic violence are especially challenging and have been selectively enforced (Schoenholtz 2015, pp. 111-12) . 33 Domestic violence-based claims may fit within gender-based claims, but decision-makers often treat them differently and have been slow to recognize them as a PSG (Boyd 2018, p. 3) . In Canada, while decision-makers tend to define complex groups (Schoenholtz 2015, p. 112) , the Federal Court in AB v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 237 at para. 13 recently affirmed that "[i]t is now beyond dispute that gender-based domestic violence may give rise to a refugee claim." 34 Recently, the United States has seen a shift in its approach to domestic violence-based claims, from the BIA's 2014 landmark decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec 388 (BIA 2014), recognizing that women fleeing domestic violence can constitute a PSG to the Attorney General's 2018 decision to overturn Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec 316 (AG 2018) on the basis that, inter alia, domestic violence will generally not qualify for asylum. 35 Following this decision, the UNHCR submitted amicus curie briefs asserting that Matter of A-Bwas interpreted wrongly and that a person at risk of domestic violence may constitute a PSG under the protected characteristics approach where their relationship status is immutable because of external factors (religion, culture, legal, etc.) or the social perception test based on cultural stigmas and male dominance. 36
Age
Age may be recognized as a protected status under the protected characteristics approach because it is an immutable characteristic. While age has been long-recognized in some countries as capable of constituting a PSG, 37 this category is becoming more prominent with the rise in refugee claims by unaccompanied minors and often overlaps with other grounds. 38 This ground received some pushback in the United States based on the logic that age changes over time; 39 however, the UNHCR's 31 Hathaway and Foster (2014, p. 448) highlight several examples from the United Kingdom and United States. For a recent example where a person was found to be at risk because of a family member's actions, see the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal's decision in AC (Venezuela), [2019] NZIPT 801438-439 at para. 201 [finding the mother is at risk from groups in Venezuela and Colombia for her political opinion opposing the Venezuelan government, and her son is at risk for MSPG, namely family]. 32 For example, Germany rejected a claimant in the context of a "personal vendetta" and the US rejected "retaliation" as a basis for a claim (Foster 2012, p. 56). 33 See (Boyd 2018 ) for a recent review of case law on domestic violence-based refugee claims in Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 34 But see (Boyd 2018, p. 14) finding the rejection rate in Canada for domestic violence-based claims is high. 35 The Attorney General rejected that persecution by non-state actors in relation to domestic violence and gang violence could constitute a PSG. For an extensive review of the United States' approach to gender-based violence as a PSG and critique of Matter of A-B-, see (Vogel 2019 but acknowledging that "mutability of age is not within one's control, and that if an individual has been persecuted in the past on account of an age-described particular social group, or faces such persecution at a time when that individual's explanation that age is immutable at the relevant time highlights that claims should not be rejected on the basis that age changes (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 450; Foster 2012, p. 58) . Age is a particularly relevant ground for young persons, though it can apply to persons in any age category. 40 Decision-makers tend to refer to age categories such as "children" or "youth" that capture the individual's vulnerability, rather than a precise age (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 449; Schoenholtz 2015, p. 115) . However, inconsistent decisions highlight the same challenge faced in other areas of balancing between a broad definition while still being sufficiently descriptive. 41
Disability
An individual may be a protected person where persecution is based on a disability. However, there is little case law on this (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 451; Foster 2012, p. 61 ) and those who do argue disability as a PSG have faced difficulties proving that disability-based discrimination amounts to persecution (Conte 2016, pp. 329-30, 335-36) or that their disability is perceived as setting them apart from society (AAT 2019, p. 33). The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United Nations 2006b) defines 'disability' broadly to encompass long-term physical and intellectual disabilities and illnesses. 42 Decision-makers have interpreted this PSG to include those with impaired vision and hearing, HIV/AIDS, autism, albinism, and mental illness (Foster 2012, p. 62, Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 452; Crock et al. 2013, pp. 751-53) .
A 'long-term' disability would be considered immutable under the protected characteristics approach (Crock et al. 2013, p. 751 ) and disability-based claims have been recognized in Canada. 43 Several jurisdictions that apply the social visibility test have also recognized disability-based claims, such as France and Australia (Foster 2012, p. 83) . However, Europe's Qualification Directive poses a challenge for persons whose disability is immutable but not visible (Conte 2016, p. 341) . The United States has also recognized disability as constituting a PSG in several Circuit courts (Kanter and Rosenthal 2018) . South Africa has gone as far as including persons with disabilities as a social group in its domestic legislation protecting refugees, though this is an anomaly (Crock et al. 2013, p. 750 ).
Economic or Social Class
Economic or social class may constitute a PSG based on current or past status (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 453) . Social class is especially relevant in countries that are "highly stratified by reference to clans, tribes, or castes" (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 453) or strict cultural norms 44 and has been recognized under the protected characteristics and social perception approaches. 45 Protection age places him within the group, a claim for asylum may be cognizable"]. See also Cece v Holder, 733 3d 662 (7th Cir 2013) [recognizing a PSG was characterized by several factors, including being young]. 40 Hathaway and Foster (2014, p. 449 ) find that age is frequently applied in claims by children, though it could apply to the elderly. For an example where the elderly was a relevant PSG, see RRT Case No 1005628, [2010] RRTA 822 at para. 37 [finding "elderly Afghan women without male protection" as a PSG]. 41 Foster (2012, pp. 59-60) points to claims described as young males have been rejected as too imprecise, while claims describing young Salvadorian males recruited but refusing to join a gang as too narrow. 42 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United Nations 2006b, art 1) protects persons with "long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments." See also (Foster 2012, p. 61 (2018, para. 7-18) took the position that women who assert their human rights and are viewed as not adhering to prevailing norms can be a PSG because their beliefs are so fundamental they should not be renounced (satisfying the protected characteristic approach) or they are perceived as different from society (satisfying the social perception approach). 45 Germany, New Zealand, and the United States have recognized claims based on social groups (Hathaway and Foster 2014, pp. 453-54; Foster 2012, p. 67 ).
based on economic class is more inconsistent, with claims manifesting from both high and low status. Class-based groups based on economic status, such as professionals in Cambodia, have historically been persecuted. 46 The Supreme Court of Canada in Ward recognized others have been persecuted for their past status imposed on them by the agent of persecution (IRB 2018, s. 4.5) , though Canadian courts have generally been unwilling to extend protection where a person fears criminality based on their former status. 47 In the United States and Australia, there is some support for finding wealthy persons targeted by criminal organizations as constituting a PSG. 48 Additionally, individuals in situations of poverty may constitute a class where they cannot practically disassociate from this status, such as the "Haitian poor" (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 452; Foster 2012, p. 68) . 49 The UNHCR recognizes members' economic activities may be at the root of persecution where they are an obstacle to government policy (UNHCR 2019, para. 78). Hathaway and Foster (2014, p. 454) find that developments in refugee protection recognizing economic classes mirror international human rights law's growing recognition that economic class is a protected status.
Voluntary Associations
Voluntary associations are controversial as a PSG because a person may disassociate from the group. However, as the second category of PSG in Ward indicates, such association may be so fundamental to a person's identity that they should not be required to change it. The jurisprudence differs depending on the type of association: human rights-related groups such as trade unions and student organizations tend to be recognized as a PSG, while groups based on occupation or wealth are more controversial with inconsistent results. 50 The United States in Acosta rejected taxi drivers as a PSG because individuals do not have "a right to work in the job of his choice" (Foster 2012, p. 72). Canada, 51 New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have also rejected occupation-based claims following this line of reasoning (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 456) . However, changing one's occupation may be unrealistic for some, and the freedom to choose (or not be unfairly deprived of) one's work is an internationally protected human right ((United Nations 1966b, art 6(1)); Foster 2012, pp. 71-73). Occupation may also significantly overlap with other grounds, such as political opinion in the context of government employees, members of the military, or police officers (Foster 2012, p. 71).
Group membership based on wealth is similarly inconsistent. While some states accept wealth under the social perception approach, states that follow the protected characteristics approach have typically rejected such claims on the basis that there are no protected private property rights under international law and a person can easily disassociate from such property (Hathaway and Foster 2014, 46 The persecution of professionals in Cambodia is often cited as a classic example of class-based persecution (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 452 (IRB 2018, s. 4.5) . 50 For example, in Australia some occupational groups, such as beauty school workers, were found to be a PSG while others, such as tourist industry workers, were not (AAT 2019, pp. 33-34). In the United States, occupation has been rejected as a PSG (Hathaway and Foster 2014, pp. 455-56; Foster 2012, p. 69) . 51 The Federal Court of Canada in Alvarez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 402 upheld the decision-maker's finding that the claimant's status as an engineer did not constitute a PSG, though it did not conclude that such a status could never meet the requirements of MPSG. The Court went on to affirm that employment and occupation will generally not raise issues related to human rights or non-discrimination that underpin refugee protection. p. 458). Consequently, Hathaway and Foster (2014, p. 458 ) suggest wealth may not be an appropriate category for refugee protection. Foster (2012, p. 70) also notes that few claims turn on the question of wealth as the decision-maker often rejects the claim "on the basis of a lack of nexus, rather than on the discrete issue of PSG analysis." For example, Canadian decision-makers often reject claims linked to a generalized risk of violence due to (perceived) wealth bearing no nexus to a Convention ground. 52 However, to the extent that wealth overlaps with economic status, protection may be desirable.
Former Status
Former status or association is included as a PSG because a person cannot change his or her history or past experience (Hathaway and Foster 2014, pp. 458-59; UNHCR 2011, p. 87) . This category can include former trafficking victims, child soldiers, civilian witnesses, employees, etc. (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 459; Foster 2012, pp. 64-65; Maystre 2014, p. 984; Schoenholtz 2015, p. 116) . For example, former status as a child soldier meets the social perception approach because society generally recognizes children as a group and may be recognized under the protected characteristics approach based on shared experience and age (Maystre 2014, p. 984) .
This category can be challenging for individuals associated with groups that have a criminal aim: a current member may not be protected because criminality is not fundamental to a person's identity nor is there a right to pursue criminal activity, while a former member cannot change that status (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 459) . Decision-makers have sometimes distinguished between where a person joined the group voluntarily or forcibly, more readily recognizing protection for the latter (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 459; Foster 2012, p. 66) . Further, claims based on former status are less likely to succeed in jurisdictions that follow the social perception approach (Foster 2012, p. 66). Even within jurisdictions, there are often divergent views. For example, three Circuit courts in the United States have found former gang membership can constitute a PSG, while two Circuit courts have rejected it (Quintero 2018, pp. 230-31) .
Claims based on former or perceived gang membership are gradually becoming common. The UNHCR's recent intervenor submission in Grace v Barr (Attorney General), Brief for the UNHCR as Amicus Curiae, No 19-5013 at 27-28 (DC Cir 2019) affirmed its position that persons at risk of gang violence and persons who have refused to join a gang may constitute a PSG. Individuals have asserted that the risk of gang-based violence for rejecting recruitment, refusing to pay extortion, or even being perceived as a gang member due to visible identifiers, can constitute a PSG (Schoenholtz 2015, pp. 116-17) . These increasingly frequent claims are controversial and have been met with only limited success in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Schoenholtz 2015, pp. 117-18) .
This category is problematic when decision-makers subjectively consider who is 'worthy' of protection based on past experiences (Foster 2012, p. 66). However, the Refugee Convention permits exclusion for reasons of serious criminality and where such protection creates a danger for the host state ((United Nations 1951, art 1F(b), 33(2)); Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 460; Foster 2012, p. 66) . A proper interpretation should not focus on the subject matter of the claim, but rather separate analyses of MPSG and reasons for exclusion (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 460; Foster 2012, p. 67 
Other Refugee Law Instruments
The Refugee Convention is the foundational, but not sole, refugee law instrument. Three regional instruments have extended the 'refugee' definition to enhance protection. The 1966 Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of Refugees ("Bangkok Principles"), a non-binding treaty adopted by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization, defines a refugee as a person who fears persecution on the grounds of "race, colour, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, gender, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group" (AALCO 1966, art 1). This adds three protected groups-colour, ethnic origin, and gender-to the five mirrored in the Refugee Convention. The Bangkok Principles further extends 'refugee' to include persons "who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order" is compelled to seek refuge (AALCO 1966, art 2). The 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa adopts the same grounds of persecution as listed in the Refugee Convention, but extends protection on the same grounds as the Bangkok Principles. 53 Lastly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, a non-binding treaty with considerable moral authority in Latin America (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, p. 38) , recommends the Refugee Convention definition include "persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order." 54
Protected Groups in International Human Rights Law
Since general human rights law has had an important impact on issues associated with refugees, notably the prohibition against refoulement (the removal of a person to a country where this person might be subjected to persecution, torture or inhuman or cruel punishment or treatment), 55 it is useful to set out some general principles of international human rights law ("IHLR") and examine how far they shed light on the question of protected groups as part of the provisions dealing with non-discrimination in human rights treaties. This is of especial relevance as some recent jurisprudence in the United Kingdom has indicated that the Refugee Convention grounds are based on this concept of non-discrimination. 56 While historically the concept of human rights had emerged in a fragmentary manner at the domestic level in primarily West European and North American states before the Second World War, the horrors of that war provided an impetus for the international community to begin devising a comprehensive international regime to protect basic human rights. The first steps in this direction were 1945 Charter of the United Nations ("UN Charter") (United Nations 1945b) and the 1948 Universal Declaration for Human Rights ("UDHR") (United Nations 1948b). The UN Charter mentions "international co-operation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" 57 as one of the main purposes of the United Nations while the UDHR, albeit non-binding, provides some more detail in thirty articles as to what these fundamental human rights entail. Interestingly, the UDHR does not refer to protected groups in the article dealing with refugees 58 but mentions a large number of groups as examples in its general article dealing with fundamental rights, namely race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 59 53 OAU 1966, art I(1)-(2). For a historical overview of this definition, see (Jackson 1999, pp. 191-94) . 54 (UNHCR 1984, s III(3) ). For a historical overview of this definition, see (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, p. 38) . 55 See (Burson and Cantor 2016, pp. 1-24) . 56 See (Cantor 2016, pp. 390-91) . For a general overview of non-discrimination in international law, see (Farrior 2015) . 57 Articles 1(3), while articles 13(b), 55(c) and 76(c) refer to the same groups (United Nations 1945b). 58 "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution" ((United Nations 1948b, art. 14(1))). 59 Article 2, with article 16 dealing with the right to marry refers to race, nationality and religion (United Nations 1948b).
International Human Rights Instruments
Following these initial steps to protect human rights in the sense of creating inalienable individual rights against the power of the state and the collective rights within that state, 60 two universal (as in with global reach) general (as in covering a bundle of rights) human rights treaties were created on 16 December 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") (United Nations 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") (United Nations 1966b). Both these treaties include articles prohibiting certain behaviour-based distinctions related to protected groups, which is the same iteration as set out in the UDHR 61 or limited subsets of this general category. 62 Some of the core rights found in these universal, general, and binding international instruments have been fleshed out and developed by the United Nations in treaties protecting either specific human rights or specific categories of persons. Within the first category of treaties, protecting specific human rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965, which has protected groups based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin ((United Nations 1966c, art 1 (1)) 68 In addition to these universal conventions, which were negotiated under the United Nations auspices, the International Labour Organization ("ILO"), a specialized United Nations agency, has also been very active in the field of human rights. The ILO has adopted 189 conventions in the area of labour standards, of which eight are considered to be fundamental ones (ILO n.d.) . Of these fundamental conventions, only three-the 1951 Equal Renumeration Convention, the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, and the 1958 Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation-refer to protected groups. 69
Regional Human Rights Instruments
Not only have human rights come within the important purview of global institutions, most regions have undertaken steps to address the protection of individuals by introducing general human rights treaties or binding instruments for specific subject matters. This has happened in Africa, the Americas, the Middle East, Asia, and especially, Europe.
In Africa, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHR," also known as the "Banjul Charter") was adopted on 26 June 1981 Convention") . 74 In the Americas, the most important human rights treaty is the American Convention on Human Rights ("ACHR") of 22 November 1969, adopted by the Organization of American States. 75 There are six other human rights treaties in this region, two general 76 and four dealing with specific categories of human rights, namely torture, 77 forced disappearance, 78 violence against women 79 and discrimination against persons with disabilities. 80 In the Middle East, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted the Arab Charter of Human Rights on 15 September 1994 81 while in Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a Human Rights Declaration on 19 November 2012. 82 In Europe, the most important regional human rights treaty in terms of its impact on the practice of States is the European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR"), 83 which was adopted by the Council of 70 The preamble and general article 2 use the same language as the UDHR, the ICCPR, ICESCR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (OAU 1981). 71 It uses the same definition of refugee with the same protected groups as the Refugee Convention in articles I(1) and IV (OAU 1969) . 72 It uses the same language as the UDHR in general article 3 (OAU 1990) . 73 It uses the same language regarding protected groups as the UDHR in its preamble (African Union 2003). 74 Note it has no reference to protected groups (African Union 2009). 75 It uses virtually the same language as the UDHR but changes the last category from "any other status" to "any other social condition" in general article 1(1); it refers to a more limited set of protected group in articles 13(5) (dealing with hate propaganda and mentioning race, color, religion, language, or national origin); article 22(8) (dealing with deportation and referring to race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions) and article 27(1) (dealing with suspension of guarantees and referring to race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin) (OAS 1969) . 76 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OAS 1999a), which repeats the ACHR-protected groups in its general article 3, while the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (OAS 1990) does not reference protected groups. 77 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (OAS 1985) with no reference to protected groups. 78 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (OAS 1994a) with no reference to protected groups. 79 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (OAS 1994b) with a reference to class, race or ethnic group, income, culture, level of education, age or religion in the preamble while general article 9 states "With respect to the adoption of the measures in this Chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, among others, their race or ethnic background or their status as migrants, refugees or displaced persons. Similar consideration shall be given to women subjected to violence while pregnant or who are disabled, of minor age, elderly, socioeconomically disadvantaged, affected by armed conflict or deprived of their freedom." 80 Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities (OAS 1999b), with no reference to protected groups. 81 It repeats the wording of the UDHR in general article 2 while adding at the end "and without any discrimination between men and women" (League of Arab States 1994). 82 Article 1 for the most part repeats the wording of the UDHR but does not mention colour, replaces "sex" with "gender" and "property" with "economic status," and adds "age" and "disability" while deleting "other status" (ASEAN 2012). There is also a 2007 Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ASEAN 2007) and a 2013 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and Elimination of Violence against Children (ASEAN 2013), but neither refer to protected groups. 83 General article 14 has a list of protected groups, which is similar to the one in the UDHR but adds "association with a national minority" (Council of Europe 1950); article 14 has been the subject of a large body of jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights, which has resulted in the inclusion of additional categories under the heading "other status", specifically gender identity and sexual orientation, see (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the European Europe 84 on 4 November 1950. Apart from this overarching treaty, the Council of Europe has been responsible for a large body of human rights protection resulting in the issuance of another 22 treaties in this field, of which nine are protocols to the ECHR dealing with procedural matters, while the other 13 deal with specific human rights issues (such as social rights, torture, minority protection, biomedicine, trafficking in human beings and migration) or with the protection of specific persons (such as the protection of children in general as well as protection of children against sexual exploitation and the protection of women against violence). 85
Observations
An overview of the references to protected groups is captured in Table 1 . The vertical axis represents geographical distribution and the horizontal axis is arranged according to subject matter divided into six parts: the total number of human rights treaties examined; the number of treaties with a reference to protected groups (PGs); the number of treaties where the references to protected groups are of an aspirational nature in the sense that they are not connected to a specific obligation but appear either in the preamble or the general article(s) of the treaty; the number of articles with a reference to protected groups in aspirational articles; the number of treaties with references in articles with substantive obligations; and the number of articles with a reference to protected groups in substantive obligations. The last two columns could benefit from more analysis. The four treaties with substantive articles in respect to protected groups are the ICCPR (dealing with equality before the law, public emergencies and children) and the Enforced Disappearance Convention (dealing with extradition) at the global level, Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe 2018, pp. 155-228). The ECHR initially provided for narrower protection against discrimination limited to the enjoyment of a Convention right. Protocol 12 (Council of Europe 2000) creates a general prohibition against discrimination by replacing "enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention" with "enjoyment of any right set forth by law" in general article 1. 84 The Council of Europe was established in 1949 with a view of working towards European integration; it has 47 members. 85 and the ACHR (dealing with hate propaganda, deportation and suspension of guarantees) and the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (dealing with refugees) at the regional level.
In terms of wording, of the nine articles which have a reference to protected groups in their substantive articles, the following language is used:
• ICCPR article 2 dealing with equality before the law: race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status; • ICCPR article 4 dealing with public emergencies: race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin; • ICCPR article 24 dealing with children: race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth; • Enforced Disappearance Convention article 7 dealing with extradition: sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions or membership of a particular social group; • ACHR article 13 dealing with hate propaganda: race, colour, religion, language, or national origin; • ACHR article 22 dealing with deportation: race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions; • ACHR article 27 dealing with suspension of guarantees: race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin; • Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa article 1 defining "refugee" and article 4 dealing with non-discrimination: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Looking at the protected groups mentioned in these articles, it is apparent that the articles in the global treaties have the broadest reach in the sense that none of their regional counterparts go beyond the number and type of protected groups mentioned in the global treaties. At the global level, the ICCPR article dealing with equality before the law has the most extensive reach in the three articles of that treaty whereas the Enforced Disappearance Convention, while more limited in its scope, has added the notion of "ethnic group" and refers to "particular social group" as opposed to "social origin". Interestingly, this latter treaty, which is fairly recent, uses wording similar to the Refugee Convention but adds "sex" and "ethnic origin." It should also be noted that the two conventions dealing with immigration issues, such as refugees (the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa) or deportation (the American Convention on Human Rights) use language that is either identical or very similar to the language in the Refugee Convention.
Protected Groups in Transnational Criminal Law
Transnational criminal law (TCL) covers the indirect suppression by international law through domestic criminal law of criminal activities that have actual or potential transboundary effects. TCL is enforced by prosecution in domestic courts, although the source of this enforcement lies in the obligations contained in multilateral suppression treaties (Currie and Rikhof 2013, pp. 10-20, 325-26) .
There is a total of 33 TCL treaties, 14 of which refer to protected groups, again as with IHRL, as part of non-discriminatory provisions. This includes 19 international anti-terrorism conventions, seven of which have a reference to protected groups, usually couched in the article dealing with extradition with the following language: "a request for the extradition of an alleged offender, pursuant to this Convention, shall not be granted if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for an offence set forth in article 1 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion." 86 A similar provision can also be found in the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ((United Nations 1988b, art. 6(6))), the 2000 There have also been three regional TCL treaties with references to protected groups, primarily in the area of the prevention of terrorism, namely in the Americas 87 and Europe. 88 Treaties dealing with the same subject matter in Africa, Asia and the Middle East do not have such a reference. 89
Protected Groups in International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law (IHL) has regulated the conduct of states and armed groups during armed conflict since 1856. The most important IHL conventions are the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (ICRC (1949a (ICRC ( , 1949b (ICRC ( , 1949c (ICRC ( , 1949d ) and their two 1977 Additional Protocols (ICRC (1977a,  1977b) ). The Fourth Geneva Convention (ICRC 1949d), dealing with the protection of civilians, is the most extensive in terms of protected groups, which are mentioned on three occasions: article 3, dealing with fundamental guarantees in non-international armed conflicts; 90 article 13, which is the general article with respect to the part of the Convention regulating the general protection of populations; 91 and article 27, dealing with territories. 92 As well, article 31 of the First Geneva Convention (ICRC 1949a), dealing with the return of sick and wounded members of the armed forces, also includes protected groups. 93 Additional Protocol I (ICRC 1977a) contains two references to protected groups, namely in article 9, dealing with the general field of application of the part dealing with the wounded, sick and shipwrecked 86 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (League of Arab States 1998). In Asia, see the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (SAARC 1987). 90 Article 3(1), which has the same text in the other three Conventions, says: "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria" (ICRC (1949a (ICRC ( , 1949b (ICRC ( , 1949c (ICRC ( , 1949d ).
A different text (sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, other similar criteria) can also be found in article 12, dealing with humane treatment, of the First Geneva Convention (ICRC 1949a), which deals with the wounded, sick and shipwrecked member of armed forces and the Second Geneva Convention (ICRC 1949b), which deals with the wounded, sick and shipwrecked member of armed forces at sea. 91 "The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war" (ICRC 1949d, art. 13) . This article can also be found in the Third Geneva Convention (ICRC 1949c, art 16) dealing with the treatment of prisoners of war. 92 "Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion" ((ICRC 1949d, art. 27 (3))). 93 "The selection of personnel for return under Article 30 shall be made irrespective of any consideration of race, religion or political opinion" ((ICRC 1949a, art. 31(1))). and 75 dealing with fundamental guarantees. Additional Protocol II (ICRC 1977b) has one reference, namely in article 2, dealing with the general field of application. All three have the same wording. 94
Protected Groups in International Criminal Law
There is a conceptual difference between international criminal law (ICL) and TCL. The most accepted approach with respect to ICL is that it refers to conduct that is prohibited under international law itself, and it is international law that provides for individual liability. The enforcement of this area of law manifests itself either directly, when international institutions apply international criminal law, or indirectly, when states bring perpetrators before national courts through the application of extended forms of jurisdiction, primarily universal jurisdiction (Currie and Rikhof 2013, pp. 10-20, 325-26) . The international crimes of aggression, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are the foremost examples of crimes that are enforced through both direct and indirect means.
The earliest ICL instruments are the 1945 Nuremberg Charter (United Nations 1945a), the 1946 Charter for the Tokyo Tribunals (United States 1946) and the 1948 Genocide Convention (United Nations 1948a), which recognized that certain groups, which had been victimized as a result of certain characteristics, should be given protection. The first two instruments indicated that the tribunals had jurisdiction to prosecute persons involved in persecution on political, racial or religious grounds (the latter only in the Nuremberg Charter) as a crime against humanity, 95 while the Genocide Convention extended its reach to national, ethnical, racial or religious groups for the international crime of genocide (United Nations 1948a, art. 2) .
ICL underwent a rapid growth in the nineties with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") in 1993 and Rwanda ("ICTR") in 1994, which contained definitions of both genocide ((United Nations 1993, art. 4(2) ); United Nations 1994b, art. 2) and crimes against humanity ((United Nations 1993, art. 5(h) ); (United Nations 1994b, art. 3(h))) with the same wording as the post-Second World War instruments. Two internationalized tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL") in 2002 and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC") in 2004, 96 of which only the latter contained the crime of genocide in its founding document with again the same wording as in the Genocide Convention, expanded slightly on the list of protected groups in crimes against humanity in that the SCSL Statute added ethnic origin (United Nations 2002, art. 2(h)), while the ECCC document added ethnic and national origin (National Assembly of Cambodia 2001, arts. 4, 5) . The most recent iteration of ICL 97 is the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute"), which still contains the same definition of genocide (United Nations 1998, art. 6) but has added a number of new categories to the protected groups in the crimes constituting a crime against humanity to now include: political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law ((United Nations 1998, art. 7 (1)(h))). 94 "[R]ace, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria" (ICRC 1977a, art. 9(1), 75(1)); (ICRC 1977b, art. 2(1)). 95 Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter (United Nations 1945a) and article 5(c) of the Charter for the Tokyo Tribunal (United Nations 1948a), which omitted the reference to religious grounds. 96 They are internationalized in a number of aspects: first, they are the result of an agreement between the United Nations and the country where the tribunal is based; second, the funding is provided for the most part by the international community; third, the personnel of all the organs of these institutions are a mix of local and international employees. There have been other internationalized institutions, but they are of less importance as their statutes are derived from the two main ones while the jurisprudence emanating from them have been of less precedential value. For more information about these institutions, see (Currie and Rikhof 2013, pp. 219-25) . 97 There is the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights ("Malabo Protocol"), which was adopted in 2014 but it does not add any new categories of protected groups for either genocide or crimes against humanity in its articles 28(B) and (C) (African Union 2014); moreover, it is not yet in force.
Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity and Protected Groups
Persecution is one of the 11 crimes recognized as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute. 98 In order for any of these crimes to amount to a crime against humanity it needs to be shown, as a minimum, that they were committed in a systematic and widespread fashion and that the targets of these crimes were part of civilian population ((United Nations 1998, art . 7(1)) ).
The crime of persecution is defined by ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence as an act or omission that discriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law and was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the grounds listed in their statutes. 99 An act or omission is considered discriminatory when a victim is targeted because of his or her membership in a group defined by the perpetrator on a political, racial, or religious basis. 100 Conceptually, persecution in ICL and refugee law can be seen as two sides of the same coin in that in refugee law, victims are protected from state action, while in ICL, the perpetrators of persecution, most often on behalf of a state, are the subject of ICL; it is certainly not inconceivable that the same event can result in reactions by both areas of law. 101 The Rome Statute has both narrowed and broadened the crime of persecution in article 7(h). It has been broadened by extending the groups which can be victimized while narrowing it by insisting that this crime is only justiciable if it has been committed in connection to another crime in the Statute, or in the words of the Statute:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 102 Most recently, the definition of persecution has been the subject of debate at the International Law Commission, the United Nations legal thinktank. In the Commission's Fourth Report on Crimes against Humanity, the Special Rapporteur indicated that: 98 The other crimes, listed in articles 7(1)(a) to (k) of the Rome Statute (United Nations 1998), are: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, sexual offences, enforced disappearance, apartheid and inhumane acts.
The Rome Statute includes one other article with a reference to protected groups, namely article 21 regarding applicable law, which says the application and interpretation of law must be without distinction on grounds such as gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, but there is no jurisprudence with respect to these protected groups (United Nations 1998). 99 16 November 2018, para. 714, 718, 720-21. 101 See below note 124 for further explanation; see also generally (Acevedo 2017; Oosterveld 2014; Maystre 2014) . 102 This definition is found in article 7(1)(h), while article 7(2)(g) says: "'Persecution' means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity" (United Nations 1998 With respect to the first half of the subparagraph, a group of twenty special rapporteurs and an independent expert, representing a wide array of subject areas, urged that the grounds for persecution set forth at the beginning of subparagraph (h)-which currently reads "persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law"-be expanded and updated so as to include persecution on grounds of language, social origin, age, disability, health, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex characteristics and indigenous, refugee, statelessness or migratory status. (Murphy 2019, para. 60) 
Genocide and Protected Groups
Genocide refers to the commission of very serious crimes with the intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (United Nations 1998, art. 6) . It can be seen as an extreme form of persecution, in that every form of genocide is also a crime against humanity but for the latter, there is no need to show to intention to destroy a group (Currie and Rikhof 2013, p. 134) .
The "group" in question must be "a national, ethnical, racial or religious" one. In delineating the protected groups in this way, the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention appears to have been to "cover only stable groups into which human beings are born without an (easy) way out," and genocide against political and social groups was explicitly excluded (Currie and Rikhof 2013, pp. 114-15) . 103 The ICTR's decision in Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, para. 512-515, offered useful definitions: a 'national group' is "a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond of common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties"; an 'ethnic group' is "a group whose members share a common language or culture"; a 'racial group' is a group "based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors"; and a 'religious group' is a group "whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship." 104 In terms of proving as fact the existence of the group and which category(ies) it falls under, the test appears to be a mixed objective/subjective one, 105 though a fair amount of weight is given to the subjective view of either the victim or the perpetrator-that is, did either the victim or the perpetrator, or both, view the victim as "belonging to a group slated for destruction." 106 However, the preference appears to be to evaluate the question on the basis of both the subjective and the objective evidence in each individual case. 107 The International Court of Justice has held that the group must be defined positively, in a manner based on the characteristics of the group itself, and not negatively (e.g., "the 'non-Serb' population"). 108 Only a person belonging to one or more of the four types of groups mentioned in the preamble of the above definition would fall within the class of victims. 109 While the definition of genocide, including the categories of victim groups, has not changed in the statutes of the international tribunals or the International Criminal Court ((United Nations 1993, art. 4(2) ); United Nations 1994b, art. 2; United Nations 1998, art. 6), the implementation of the Rome Statute at the domestic level presents quite a different picture. In a number of the 70 states which enacted legislation to implement the Rome Statute, more categories have been added. 110 Extreme examples of this are France and Burkina Faso (where the legislation adds to the definition of genocide, in addition the ones in the Rome Statute, any group that is defined by an arbitrary characteristic) and Canada (which refers to an identifiable group of persons) (CICC 2017, p. 28) . Other countries have changed their legislation in a less dramatic manner by adding other specific protected groups in addition to the traditional ones of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. 
Observations with Respect to International Law
In total, 110 international and regional instruments have been examined, 60 of which mention protected groups (31 IHRL, 14 TCL, 6 IHL and 9 ICL) and of which 30 treaties refer to those groups in substantive articles (4, 11, 6 and 9, respectively). These 110 documents include 59 IHLR instruments, 33 TCL instruments, six IHL instruments, nine ICL instruments, and three refugee law instruments, 114 including the Refugee Convention. A full list of the instruments and protected groups, divided by area of law, can be found in Appendix A, Tables A1-A5 . Looking comprehensively at protected grounds in all the instruments, it is clear the protected grounds in the Refugee Convention are appropriate but may not be adequate. There are 29 categories of protected groups set out in the various instruments, as listed in Appendix B. The most common categories, defined as those that are present in more than 50% of the instruments with protected grounds, are race, religion, nationality, political opinion, ethnic origin, colour, and sex. Of these, the first four grounds are protected under the Refugee Convention. Ethnic origin is not explicitly protected, but the UNHCR does provide some guidance to the effect that nationality should be understood as broader than citizenship to include ethnic and linguistic groups (UNHCR 2019, para. 74) . Similarly, colour could also fall under an existing category, namely race, but otherwise would possibly qualify under MPSG as both immutable under the protected characteristics approach and a visible distinction setting a person apart from society under the social perception approach. In most circumstances, sex or gender appear to be used interchangeably, but in one treaty, sex is listed alongside gender. 115 lists sex and gender, as well as sexual orientation, in the same list of protected groups.
Principles add only these three categories-ethnic origin, colour, and sex (listed as gender)-to the list of protected groups. Additionally, protected groups based on social origin, language, birth, 'other' status, economic status, and property were recognized in at least 10 or more instruments. The first three categories may already be sufficiently captured by an existing protected group in the Refugee Convention. Social origin is comparable to MPSG; adding 'social origin' as a standalone ground would be superfluous. As noted above, language (or linguistic group) may fall under nationality and, alternatively, has been recognized as an example of a PSG in Ward. 116 Similarly, birth may be recognized under nationality or, at the least, be viewed as immutable under the protected characteristics approach of MPSG. The 'other' status provides broad protection to similarly situated groups; while the Refugee Convention does not contain a similar catch-all provision, MPSG is a flexible category and a broader 'other' category may not serve the overarching purpose of protecting identifiable groups against persecution.
The final two categories, economic status and property, are more problematic. Economic-based claims have faced significant challenges in domestic jurisprudence. Claimants have been successful where they were unable to disassociate from their economic status, but less so where the claim is based on wealth or property ownership. Wealth is a protected ground in all the IHL treaties and its variants are recognized in several IHRL statutes. 117 The Rome Statute does not define persecution with respect to wealth, but states that the applicable law must be interpreted and applied consistently with internationally recognized human rights, without adverse distinction on grounds including, inter alia, wealth ((United Nations 1998, art. 21 (3))). However, as few claims are based on wealth or property, it may be premature to say that economic-based claims are categorically excluded from protection.
IHRL does not appear to be the most useful reference point for expanding protected groups. First, most of the protected groups appear in aspirational articles and, as such, do not have a great deal of precedent value. Second, the reference to protected groups in the small number of substantive articles, while typically broader than in refugee law, are usually in the nature of the negative obligation of non-discrimination addressed at states implementing the provisions of the treaties in question in the sense that a positive obligation has to be implemented upon ratification and that this positive obligation cannot be limited by discriminatory practices; the fact that every such article contains a reference to protected groups indicates that certain obligations are or have been prone to such discriminatory practices and the purpose of the provision is to ensure it does not continue. The reference to protected groups in the Refugee Convention has a different purpose: it is part of the 'refugee' definition and, as such, must be established by the person seeking asylum in another state in a typically more private setting where a decision-maker determines whether a person positively belongs to that group. The fact that at the time of the negotiations of the Refugee Convention there was already a human rights instrument with a broad category of protected groups, together with the desire of the drafters not to have too wide a circle of protected groups in order not to open the definition to possible abuse, likely indicates that the drafters were aware of larger possible categories of protected groups but deliberately decided to frame the groups more narrowly (Zimmermann 2011, pp. 309-11; Weis 1990, p. 8) .
However, having made this general observation, it is rather striking that one substantive article bearing resemblance to the refugee situation uses language that broadens the number of protected groups, though not drastically so. This is the case with the Enforced Disappearance Convention Nations 2006a, art. 13 (7)), where the article dealing with extradition adds 'sex' and 'ethnic group' and refers to 'particular social group' as opposed to 'social origin':
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions or membership of a particular social group, or that compliance with the request would cause harm to that person for any one of these reasons.
The purpose of this article is similar to that of the non-refoulement provision in the Refugee Convention (United Nations 1951, art. 33) , namely that persons who might have committed an offence related to forced disappearance will not be subject to a foreign prosecution if that prosecution will be carried out for discriminatory reasons. The Refugee Convention does not allow for the removal of a refugee if that person would face a threat to their life on account of belonging to a protected group (with the same reference to protected groups as in its definition of persecution). If a human rights treaty prohibits a removal for a criminal prosecution and refers to an expanded iteration of protected groups, the question can be asked whether such an expansion would also be desirable for another human rights treaty, the Refugee Convention, especially if the expansion is modest, adding sex and ethnic group to the five pre-existing groups.
This argument has even more force when considering the provisions with respect to protected groups in TCL and IHL treaties. Almost all 14 TCL treaties that have articles mentioning protected groups deal with the same topic-extradition-and while most are couched in the same language as the Refugee Convention, two more recent conventions, the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (IMO 2005, art. 10) and the 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (ICAO 2010b, art. XIII), have updated their text to "race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender", which mirrors the language in the Enforced Disappearance Convention.
While IHL does not have a mention of protected groups in the area of extradition, it is striking that already in 1949 all four Geneva Conventions mandated, in common article 3, that persons not taking part in hostilities should be treated "humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria." This is broader than other articles in these conventions dealing with non-combatants, such as civilians or prisoners of war, where the adverse distinction is worded even more narrowly than the Refugee Convention, namely "race, nationality, religion or political opinion", which mirrors the development in refugee law between the text of the Statute of the International Refugee Organization and the Refugee Convention by not referring to social group. However, by the time the Geneva Conventions were supplemented by the 1977 Additional Protocols, the number of protected groups had been expanded to "race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria" in all three provisions. The fact that IHL, which deals with the regulation of the most serious human rights violations in times of war, originally mirrored the number of protected groups for non-combatants to a smaller number than the Refugee Convention but saw fit to expand due to the new needs in the theatre of war, bears reflection for an instrument applicable primarily to peacetime.
While IHRL, TCL, and IHL can provide some assistance to a possible broader understanding of protected groups in the refugee context, the situation with ICL is different. Historically, the number of protected groups were already narrower than even those in the refugee definition. This had to do with the fact that ICL has a purpose different from both IHRL and refugee law, namely prosecuting individuals for international crimes; at the time, ICL was a new approach in international law and there was a desire to proceed cautiously since this area of international law was treading even more intensely in the realm of sovereignty than IHRL for two reasons: first, IHRL would be applicable at that time only if accepted internally by states who had signed the human rights treaties, while ICL would apply whether or not a state whose nationals were subject to prosecutions would agree; second, the opprobrium attached to prosecutions was of a higher degree as in almost all cases in the post-Second World War era, the persons on trial were representative of odious state behaviour. The difference between IHRL and refugee law, on the one hand, and ICL on the other, with respect to persecution was explained in an early ICTY case. 118 Note, however, that this explanation deals more with the level of persecution than the notion of protected groups.
As ICL has specifically dealt with the notion of persecution, both directly as a crime against humanity and indirectly as genocide, and since the protected groups for these two crimes have grown dramatically since the Second World War and the reasons for the justification to have the protected groups related to those crimes be narrower than the protected groups in the Refugee Convention has not changed, it would be logical to seriously examine the protected groups in the Refugee Convention and bring them at a minimum in line with the listings in ICL to include ethnic origin, cultural, and gender/sex.
Conclusions
The Refugee Convention is the primary international instrument protecting refugees and, in 1951, was one of the first instruments to recognize protected groups. Nearly 70 years later, the number of international and regional instruments protecting persons from discrimination across a broad range of categories has grown dramatically. A review of IHRL, TCL, IHL, and ICL reveals that four of the protected groups enumerated in the Refugee Convention-race, religion, nationality, and political opinion-reflect the core categories recognized in other instruments. The fifth group-membership of a particular social group-is a flexible ground that can encompass similar protections as those found in other areas of international law. Domestic jurisprudence shows that MPSG may be used for categories that are less prevalent in international instruments, including age 119 and disability, 120 and may go further than other instruments, such as recognizing family as a PSG and, though not universally accepted, recognizing victims of domestic and gang violence as a PSG.
In conclusion, the enumerated grounds in the Refugee Convention may already protect, or at least have the potential to protect, many of the groups protected under other international law regimes. MPSG is a flexible category, and beneficial for its ability to evolve in line with contemporary refugee claims while not expanding the definition so much that the Refugee Convention's purpose is frustrated. However, examining other areas of international law shows that the notion of protected groups has resulted in consistent and detailed definitions, which could lead to a better appreciation of both the flexibility and the limitations of the parameters of protected groups in the refugee definition. Of the areas discussed, namely ICL, IHRL, IHL and TCL, the first two are the most promising, IHRL because 118 "The Trial Chamber finds, however, that these cases cannot provide a basis for individual criminal responsibility. It would be contrary to the principle of legality to convict someone of persecution based on a definition found in international refugee law or human rights law. In these bodies of law, the central determination to be made is whether the person claiming refugee status or likely to be expelled or deported has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". The emphasis is more on the state of mind of the person claiming to have been persecuted (or to be vulnerable to persecution) than on the factual finding of whether persecution has occurred or may occur. In addition, the intent of the persecutor is not relevant. The result is that the net of "persecution" is cast much wider than is legally justified for the purposes of imposing individual criminal responsibility. The definition stemming from international refugee law or human rights law cannot therefore be followed here. of its affinity in terms of its purpose of human rights protection, which is similar to the underlying purpose of refugee law while ICL is very useful since its origins in the area of protected group were very narrow because of its subject matter of criminal prosecutions but which has recently expanded and gone beyond refugee law in this aspect. Amending the refugee definition to include other groups, particularly those additional grounds identified in ICL and IHRL, either as novel categories (such as culture or colour) or as a justification for a broader approach where refugee jurisprudence has seen a narrowing of the relevant concepts (such as ethnic origin or gender/sex) may be desirable to provide greater protection and consistent decision-making, assuming that the political context is conducive to such an approach. 
Instrument Article Protected Grounds
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention I) 
Appendix B
The below protected groups are recognized in one or more international or regional instruments. There are many instances where the word used to describe the protected group is inconsistent but generally applies to the same category, such as "religion" and "faith." Where possible, the protected groups have been consolidated and additional terms are identified in brackets. 
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